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Grudge spending: the interplay between markets and culture in the 
purchase of security 
 
 
Ian Loader, Benjamin Goold and Angélica Thumala 
 
 
Abstract 
In the paper, we use data from an English study of security consumption, and recent work in 
the cultural sociology of markets, to illustrate the way in which moral and social 
commitments shape and often constrain decisions about how, or indeed whether, 
individuals and organizations enter markets for protection. Three main claims are proffered. 
We suggest, firstly, that the purchase of security commodities is a mundane, non-
conspicuous mode of consumption that typically exists outside of the paraphernalia of 
consumer culture – a form of grudge spending. Secondly, we demonstrate that security 
consumption is weighed against other commitments that individuals and organizations have 
and is often kept in check by these competing considerations. We find, thirdly, that the 
prospect of consuming security prompts people to consider the relations that obtain 
between security objects and other things that they morally or aesthetically value, and to 
reflect on what the buying and selling of security signals about the condition and likely 
futures of their society. These points are illustrated using the examples of organisational 
consumption and gated communities. In respect of each case, we tease out the evaluative 
judgments that condition and constrain the purchase of security amongst organisations and 
individuals and argue that they open up some important but neglected questions to do with 
the moral economy of security. 
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Introduction: What is the purchase of security? 
We inhabit a world of commodified security. Services and products are now 
routinely purchased in an effort to protect persons, homes, families, 
neighbourhoods, identities, spaces, and commercial or organizational interests. It is 
commonly remarked that in many societies around the world there are more private 
security guards today than public police officers, though Jean-Paul Brodeur (2010: 
275) finds that ‘strong evidence’ for this claim exists only in Canada, South Africa and 
the USA. Brodeur points out that the largest and fastest growing component of what 
is already a large and diverse security industry is not personnel but ‘security 
products and technology’ (ibid: 277). He then mobilizes the concept of the ‘police-
industrial complex’ (ibid: 305) in order to grasp the scale and reach of seemingly 
ever-expanding markets for security hardware. So ‘security’ is being bought and sold 
in abundance today. But what kind of purchase is it, and what purchase does the 
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idea of a market in security possess? What is the moral and social significance of 
protective goods in the mentalities and sensibilities of those who buy them, or who 
are invited to do so? If the marketplace is a ‘multi-vocal site for the affirmation, 
generation and transformation of meanings’ (Wherry, 2012: 7) what kinds of 
meanings are in play, and at issue, in the circulation and exchange of security 
products?  
One common answer to these questions is that the coupling of security and 
consumption has a troubling ratcheting-up effect upon the demand for, and supply 
of, protection. Several themes can be identified in sociological analyses of this kind. 
For some authors, the upsurge in private security over recent decades is a product of 
the state’s failure to assuage the social fears or satisfy the demands for order that 
neoliberal rule has generated among atomized and insecure citizens (Ericson, 2006). 
According to this view, those who can afford to do so have been encouraged—in 
security as elsewhere—to take responsibility for their own protection and break 
from their dependence on the uniformity and unreliability of state police provision. 
As Monahan (2010: 2) puts it: ‘The insecurity subject anticipates risks and minimizes 
them through consumption’ (emphasis in original). A related body of social theory 
has focussed on the celebration of consumption and the attendant rise of what 
Bauman (1988) has called the ‘consumer attitude’—the idea that one can find an 
answer to almost any social problem in a shop, or at the click of a mouse. This, the 
argument runs, has spilled over into security, where one finds anxious consumers 
shopping for ‘fear-fighting products’ (Bauman, 2006: 7) that will defend their 
persons, property, or neighbourhoods against criminal threat. In both cases, the 
animating concern is that the building of private ‘bubbles of governance’ (Rigakos 
and Greener, 2002) will drain resources and legitimacy from public provision. It is 
further suggested that consumerism and anxiety can together form a toxic, 
mutually-reinforcing mix (Loader, 1999). On this view, markets for security have a 
strong propensity to expand as fretful citizens-turned-consumers embark on a 
restless search for the latest products to quench an insatiable desire for order. As 
fear ‘proves’ and ‘renews’ itself (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 99), and the physical 
and mental structures of private ordering take root, the bonds of common 
citizenship are progressively eroded. Monahan (2010: 3) again: ‘Fear and 
perceptions of insecurity colonize life worlds and spread virally, spawning paranoia 
and motivating hypervigilance and self-regulation.’  
In this paper, we offer an alternative account of the relationship between 
markets and security, organized around the concept of grudge spending. In so doing, 
we draw upon materials generated in an English study of the meanings and 
dynamics of security consumption, the fieldwork for which we conducted in 2007-
2009.1 The study entailed in-depth interviews with 28 manufacturers and/or retailers 
                                                        
1 The project was funded by The Leverhulme Trust whose support we gratefully acknowledge. 
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of security goods/services (from local firms to global multinationals) and eight 
stakeholders/regulators in the security industry who were asked to reflect on the 
current state and future prospects of the industry. The latter comprised one MP with 
a longstanding interest in the security industry; two senior police officers; one 
representative from the Police Federation; two officials of industry associations; one 
representative from the Association of British Insurers; and one official from the 
regulatory body, the Security Industry Authority. We also interviewed 14 security 
managers from large companies or organizations (e.g., banks, supermarkets, 
shopping centres, schools, universities, transport networks) who were responsible 
for buying and managing their organization’s security; a range of representatives 
from bodies that act as intermediaries between security buyers and sellers (e.g., 
campaign groups, trade unions, professional and trade associations); three housing 
developers and two members of the planning profession. We also draw on material 
from four focus group discussions and 12 in-depth individual interviews in which 
respondents were invited to offer and discuss their experiences of, and views on, 
purchasing security goods. These respondents all lived or worked in the Oxford area 
and were a mix of professional and manual workers, and those who had retired. All 
were home-owners. They were aged between 30 and 75. Finally, we conducted a 
close reading of marketing materials produced by companies selling security 
products.        
 In making sense of our data, we turn to a body of theorizing and research 
produced by Viviana Zelizer and others working on the cultural sociology of markets 
(e.g., Spillman, 1999; Zelizer, 2011; Wherry, 2012). Zelizer takes issue in general 
terms with a view that suffuses the critical literature on private security. She objects 
to the prevalent positions on the relationship of economic to non-economic 
phenomena which assume that the social world is divided into a realm of rational 
economic exchange (markets) and separate arenas of sentiment and solidarity 
(culture). Such a division is typically accompanied by a fear of contagion between 
these spheres on the grounds that a ‘boundless market’ (Zelizer, 2011: 368) will 
colonize and undermine social or personal relations that were formerly free of the 
‘taint’ of monetary exchange (Zelizer, 2005: 20-32; 2011: 386-87). Zelizer then 
proposes an alternative to the ‘moral gloom and social vulnerability’ (2011: 369) that 
characterizes this outlook. She calls this the ‘multiple markets’ (or ‘connected lives’) 
approach. This perspective challenges the ‘unquestioned premise that once you 
mediate transactions with markets you will necessarily have uniform, powerful and 
negative effects’ (Zelizer, 2011: 359). Instead, Zelizer and others working on the 
cultural sociology of economic exchange encourage us to attend to ‘certain 
complexities in the interaction between the market and human values’ (Zelizer, 
2011: 19) and to investigate closely the ‘social and moral impact of different kinds of 
markets and monetary transactions’ (ibid: 359). The task, as they see it, is to explore 
the relationship between what people believe and what they buy, and to analyze 
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how people’s ‘commitments’ (Sen, 1977) shape their dispositions towards what can 
and cannot be exchanged. This perspective calls on us to examine ‘the cultural 
frameworks within which market transactions are interpreted’ (Spillman, 1999: 
1049) and the kinds of boundary work that individuals practice when evaluating the 
connections between economic and non-economic social practices.  
 The findings of the study reported here illustrate well the close interplay 
between markets and culture and the way in which moral and social commitments 
shape and often constrain decisions about how, or indeed whether, individuals and 
organizations enter markets for protection. The analysis proceeds as follows. We 
suggest, firstly, that the purchase of security commodities is a mundane, non-
conspicuous mode of consumption that typically exists outside of the paraphernalia 
of consumer culture – a form of grudge spending. Secondly, we demonstrate that 
security consumption is weighed against other commitments that individuals and 
organizations have and is often kept in check by these competing considerations. We 
find, thirdly, that the prospect of consuming security prompts people to consider the 
relations that obtain between security objects and other things that they morally or 
aesthetically value, and to reflect on what the buying and selling of security signals 
about the condition and likely futures of their society. This point is illustrated using 
the examples of organisational consumption and gated communities. In respect of 
each case, we tease out the evaluative judgments that condition and constrain the 
purchase of security among organisations and individuals and argue that they open 
up some important but neglected questions to do with the moral economy of 
security. As the analysis will show, a fuller, more nuanced understanding of markets 
for security has to attend to a mix of financial calculation, risk assessment and 
normative evaluation. 
 
 
Security as non-conspicuous consumption 
 
Nobody goes and buys security the same as they will buy a 39-inch plasma screen 
TV. It’s not a commodity. It’s . . . what the word? It’s a grudge buy – it’s something 
they have to do. (Manager, security company 1) 
 
In the literature on commodified security a dominant concern is that the purchase of 
protective goods and services is likely to become ensnared within and fueled by 
certain dynamics of modern consumption. Three dimensions of consumer culture 
are considered relevant in this regard. The first is the claim that consumption is 
mainly undertaken by individuals who experience it as a realm of autonomy, agency 
and sovereignty. According to Campbell, modern consumerism is characterized by 
‘its unrestrained or unrestricted individualism’ and attaches an extraordinary value 
to ‘the right of individuals to decide for themselves which goods and services they 
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consume’ (Campbell, 2004: 28). Secondly, consumption is said to be an imaginative 
realm, a space of ‘day-dreaming and fantasizing’ (Campbell, 1987: 203) where 
people are free to form mental projects and anticipate their satisfaction (Hirschman, 
1982). Thirdly, consumption is thought to be a key marker of social identity and 
belonging, a means of expressing subjectivity, signaling one’s place within prevailing 
social hierarchies, and reinforcing or unsettling social boundaries (Douglas and 
Isherwood, 1979; Bourdieu, 1984). The worry is that these elements of consumption 
can combine to generate insatiable appetites for protective commodities.  
Our research suggests that the dynamics of security consumption are not 
much like this. Rather, security is a grudge purchase. This is so for individual 
consumers. It is also the case for the organizations that make up the vast bulk of the 
trade in protective goods and services. This is very much the view of the security 
industry players we interviewed, though it also permeates the outlook of (potential) 
buyers, as we shall see. Retailers of security typically hold to the view that 
individuals and organizations ‘do not want to invest in security or see it as a benefit’ 
(Manager, security company 2). As one security industry representative put it: ‘The 
problem is that people have this attitude of “It’ll never happen to me”. Companies 
are the same – ‘Why would anyone want to rob me? I’ve got nothing to take”’ 
(Representative, security industry association). In respect of individuals, he 
continued: ‘The adage that security is a grudge purchase is correct I think. People 
don’t think [about] security initially. When you buy a house you don’t think of 
security, you just think it looks nice, it’s in the right place, the neighbours are nice. 
What you don’t think is – “Well is it secure?”’. In respect of organizations, a retailer 
of security systems made a similar point: ‘The vast majority of people see security, if 
you’re lucky, as a necessary evil, if you’re unlucky, as an unnecessary evil. They don’t 
want to spend any money on it because they don’t see it adds value to the business’ 
(Manager, security company 3). The result, on this view, is a default mode of security 
‘complacency’ (Manager, security company 3) that makes people either ‘under-
spenders’ (with insufficient protection against risk) or ‘bad-spenders’ (purchasing the 
wrong things), as one security consultant put it.  
           So what elements make up this idea of ‘grudge’? First, people are typically 
driven to spend on security not out of desire or to signal social status and belonging 
but by external actors or force of circumstances. Many interviewees spoke of 
security consumption as being largely ‘insurance-driven’ (Manager, security 
company 1); one security retailer referred to insurance as a ‘very great driving force’ 
in the industry (Manager, security company 3). A security manager from a large 
transport network we interviewed referred to health and safety legislation, 
specifically s.17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as an important exogenous 
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driver of his organization’s purchase of security.2 Others spoke of security spending 
as reactive, an act typically engaged in ‘after the horse has bolted’ (Manager, 
security company 4). One security industry representative expressed the point thus: 
‘One thing that is common is that it takes a major incident before people put their 
hands in their pockets and invest’ (Manager, security company 5).  
 The second element of grudge spending concerns consumers being highly 
price-sensitive and reluctant to pay for, or even believe in the existence of, quality 
goods and services. This view of consumers is widely shared among sellers of 
security – even if, as we shall see, it is only partially reflected in the outlook of 
buyers. Yet this pervasive perception of a reluctance on the part of consumers to 
invest in security is a structuring fact about the industry, not least because it 
animates sellers’ efforts to raise the risk consciousness of potential buyers and cajole 
them into investing greater resources in protecting their assets. Many of the industry 
players we spoke to bemoaned this state of affairs, complaining that ‘most 
companies don’t appreciate quality until there’s been an incident’ (Manager, 
security company 2), or resorting to the refrain that those who ‘pay peanuts, get 
monkeys’ (Manager, security company 6). Others held the industry to be at least 
partly responsible; there are, as the director of one security firm put it, ‘too many 
companies who are willing to take on bad work. Too many companies are unwilling 
to say no’ (Manager, security company 7). Our interviewees nonetheless shared the 
view that price-consciousness/quality-skepticism was a stubborn fact about the 
market for security goods and services. As one manager in a large security firm put 
it:  
 
It’s an extremely competitive market place with people always trying to drive down 
the price because they don’t associate it with creating value. They associate it with 
being something they have to do. In quite a lot of cases the people buying security 
are only buying it so they can put a tick in a box and say ’Yes, I’ve managed that risk, 
I’ve managed that risk, I’ve managed that risk’ (Manager, security company 6). 
 
It appears, thirdly, that the purchase of security takes place, not by way of 
advertising, branding and promotions on the part of sellers or ‘shopping around’ on 
the part of buyers, but via recommendations transmitted though informal networks 
(see generally DiMaggio and Louch, 1998). This was the typical experience of the 
security firms we interviewed. ‘90 per cent of the work I get is referrals, word of 
mouth’, observed one security consultant. Another spoke of his firm’s reliance upon 
‘referrals, repeat or retained business’ (Manager, security company 8). Another 
remarked: ‘You gain jobs by reputation . . . If you do a good job, at the golf club, or 
                                                        
2 Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 imposes on a responsible authority a duty ‘to exercise 
its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the 
need to all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area’.  
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over a beer, a customer will say “These guys are good”’ (Manager, security company 
9). On the consumer side, the university security managers we interviewed claimed 
not to respond to ‘salesmen’ but to rely instead on ‘talking to contacts’ in other 
universities. The result, it seems, is an industry that exists largely beyond the ‘high 
street’ and the associated paraphernalia of modern consumption: security is ‘not a 
business that invests in retail outlets’ and ‘rarely features in consumer products 
reviews’ (representative, Secured by Design). This indeed was the experience of our 
research: our attempts to obtain interviews with the Consumers’ Association, 
National Consumer Council, Advertising Standards Authority, Health and Safety 
Executive and Trading Standards Office were all politely refused on the grounds that 
security products have never crossed the radar screens of these organizations. In 
general, it seems that the standard techniques of modern marketing have little 
purchase on consumers who are so generally reluctant to spend: ‘Because it’s a 
grudge buy, you could do a mail shot, or drop on somebody’s doorstep a leaflet that 
tells them they need to buy an alarm system. They will look at it and say “Why? I 
don’t have a problem”’ (Manager, security company 1). 
These findings about the ‘grudge’ quality of security spending are scarcely 
news. They are a cliché of industry talk (for example, in the trade press), and have 
been a recurrent theme of previous research (Livingstone and Hart, 2003; White, 
2010; Mulone, 2013). However, the idea of grudge remains an under-theorized 
notion that would repay more careful probing. Industry talk about grudge spending 
commonly takes it to be a consequence of private security’s current composition and 
standing – the result of cowboy firms, low skills, and poor reputation. On this view, 
grudge spending is a contingent problem to be addressed – and solved – by better 
regulation and greater professionalism. We certainly encountered concerns about 
the industry among the buyers of security we interviewed. Some complained about 
being subject to ‘over-selling’ and to ‘spurious claims’ regarding security products, or 
they worried about the ‘lack of sophistication in the sales force’ (Security manager, 
large supermarket). Another buyer worried about ‘the face of the industry being the 
worst paid person they’ve got’, something that risks ‘compromising the whole damn 
thing’ (Security manager, major bank). This representative from a major transport 
network also had concerns about the quality of staff, something he thought was not 
necessarily related to the price being paid or the size of the company employed: 
 
You know, we’re paying good money for the contracts and they’re employing sub-
contractors at the cheapest possible rate, and the quality isn’t there. And that’s the 
perception of the industry. We get people asleep because they’re students all day 
and they’re doing this to make ends meet. . . . And it doesn’t matter about the size 
of the organization either. We’ve used some of the biggest players, providing 
security to a number of our depots. Same problem you know, same problem. Quality 
on the ground.              
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Problems such as these no doubt contribute to the grudge quality of spending on 
security, and to what may have become a vicious circle of low pay-poor quality-bad 
reputation. But this, in our view, is a surface dimension of the phenomenon. The 
restraint on trade that the notion of grudge presents is not simply a contingent 
outcome of the industry’s current levels of service and status. It is more profoundly 
the consequence of what one might term the double intangibility of security. 
Potential consumers of security are faced with the intangibility of risk (the problem 
of knowing precisely how at risk they are and from what source) as well as the 
intangibility of protection (the problem of knowing whether the good or service on 
offer can or will mitigate that risk). As the security manager for a large transport 
network put it: ‘It’s difficult to make a business case for prevention. How do you cost 
something that you’ve prevented? It’s very difficult’.  
 This intangibility is a basic and inescapable social fact about security – one 
that a better regulated, more professional security industry would continue to face. 
It generates two of the constitutive features of grudge as a restraining disposition 
towards the purchase of security. Firstly, it gives rise to a generic reluctance to spend 
(for fear of spending too much, too proactively): ‘People don’t want to invest in 
something that might happen, but then again it might not’ (security industry 
representative). Secondly, it creates a generic wariness about the claims made by 
those selling security services and products: ‘You can be a very good salesman about 
things. But there must also be proof of effectiveness of the measure that you’re 
taking. You don’t want a member to waste money, you know. That is why they are 
very cautious’ (representative, national retail organization).3 This dilemma, and the 
way in which it shapes the purchase of security, is nicely captured by the security 
manager of a large shopping mall: 
 
Those who pay for it grudgingly do so in the main because you cannot prove its 
success in terms of deterring or preventing crime. It’s a bit like a police officer 
walking down the street. You’re going to pay, I don’t know, £30,000 for a police 
officer and he walks for a year down Oxford High Street. How many crimes has he 
prevented for £30,000? Nobody knows. So if a store spends £5,000 on the CCTV and 
alarm system and the store is broken into and the burglar is arrested as a result of 
the equipment then it is £5,000 well spent. If that company doesn’t spend £5,000 on 
a burglar alarm or CCTV and it doesn’t get broken into what’s the point on spending 
£5,000 on security measures?  
 
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that security is a form of non-
conspicuous consumption (Shove and Warde, 1998). The purchase of security is a 
                                                        
3 This intangibility also helps to explain the informal ‘word-of mouth’ way in which protective goods 
and services are typically consumed. It has been found elsewhere that purchasers rely on informal 
networks for recommendations in relation to goods whose performance is difficult for them to assess 
(DiMaggio and Louch, 1998).   
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mundane, unglamorous, symbolically-light practice that exists largely outside the 
apparatus of modern consumer culture – shops, brands, advertising and the 
‘talkability’ (Molotch, 2005) that is both part of the pleasure of shopping and a 
means for people to ‘check’ on the social acceptability of the products they are 
consuming. Buying security seems instead to be understood as a necessary 
additional ‘investment’ in the conditions that enable one’s individual or collective 
projects to go on – an investment to which one devotes no more time, resources, or 
mental/emotional energy than is required. It is in these terms akin to buying 
insurance or having one’s car serviced – a mode of provisioning that may be 
essential to the stable ordering of things but is seldom, if ever, a source of 
imaginative pleasure, a means of affirming status and marking social difference, or 
‘an idiom for expressing core values’ (Miller, 2012: 52). Rather than shaping the 
production of values and identity, markets for security are more often shaped by 
them.           
 
 
Keeping (security) things in proportion 
Grudge spending is, however, still spending. Our interviewees typically recognized 
that individuals and organizations should bear some level of responsibility for the 
security of their person and/or property and that this may entail spending money on 
that purpose. As the security manager of a major supermarket chain put it: ‘Our 
objective is to have a safe and secure environment as free as possible from criminal 
threat, and that requires a range of people’. The security manager of a major 
transport network remarked in similar terms: ‘Everybody knows that we’ve got a 
corporate responsibility to create an environment that is safe and healthy, and we, 
each of us, have an individual responsibility to contribute to that’. It is, in short, 
commonly recognized that security is a basic organizational imperative, akin to 
‘cutting the grass’, as one local authority security manager put it.    
The point about grudge spending has to do with the evident reluctance to 
over-invest resources, time or energy in security, or to bear too great a share of the 
overall protective burden. So what forms of restraint bear on the question of 
whether and how to purchase security? Against what competing commitments is the 
purchase of security judged and kept in some kind of proportion?   
 The first and principal thing against which security has to compete in 
commercial organizations is the profit motive. While security is widely seen as a 
necessary investment in creating and sustaining the infrastructure that enables 
profits to be generated, it is also a potential – and potentially wasteful – drain on 
profits. At the very least, it is an investment that must compete with (and may 
sometimes lose out to) other commercial imperatives. Against this backdrop, the 
security managers we interviewed tended not to have dedicated budgets or 
delegated authority to spend on protective services and equipment; instead, they 
 10 
had to ‘present a business case and a strategy to the board’ (Head of security, major 
bank). As Mulone (2013) points out, this makes security managers not buyers of 
security but sellers of the idea of buying security to those at the top of corporate 
hierarchies.4  Some saw their role in this regard as engaging in ‘an education process’ 
with the company board (Head of security, major supermarket) or instilling a ‘pro-
security culture’ in the organization (Security manager, National Health Service). 
Another saw his role as trying to ensure that ‘we don’t compromise on security’ 
during an economic downturn (Head of security, major bank) – a view which 
intimates that security spending may be high on the list of items that companies cut 
during periods of austerity. In each respect, security managers recognized that the 
task of selling security to the board could be an uphill struggle: 
 
If you wear the hat of a retailer what you don’t want is all these ancillary costs which 
add to the totality of your cost and therefore put pressure on your profit margin. 
How a retailer thinks is ‘How little can I spend to sell this product at the cheapest 
possible price?’ They don’t think like criminologists and they certainly don’t think 
like police officers in doing that. My strategy is to determine where the 
vulnerabilities lie.  And my sort of preferred tactic is to get the board to agree that 
this is a real and present danger and that prescient action now will prevent a 
disaster further down the line.  
(Security manager of a major supermarket) 
 
The profit motive is not, however, the only restraint on organizational security 
purchasing. The level and kind of protective services and equipment consumed is 
also shaped by, in tension with, and may be subordinated to the wider purposes and 
priorities of any given organization. The importance of this overall purpose and the 
constraints it imposes on security practices were explained in the following terms by 
the security head of a major transport network: ‘Even in relation to the particular 
risk that we saw on 7/7, the practical measures that you can take are limited. They 
really are. Our principal function is to transport London, and we have to bear that in 
mind.’ Often, these wider organizational priorities give shape to the kinds of security 
products that are purchased; they make purchasers think hard about the ‘fit’ 
between security and the environment it is intended to protect. One of the 
university security managers we interviewed emphasized the importance of security 
systems being ‘unobtrusive and easy for those who have a right to come in to use’, 
giving the example of a newly installed access control system that was ‘visually 
                                                        
4 This position as intermediaries between the security industry and the firms that employ them makes 
security managers an obvious target for those selling protective services and hardware.  Several of 
the security firms we interviewed claimed it was much easier to sell to companies that employed 
dedicated security managers. Chief among the reasons for this is the perception that security 
managers tend to be former police officers who can be relied upon to share the sellers’ view of the 
value of security.   
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unobtrusive’ and ‘as aesthetically pleasing as possible’. Another spoke of the 
problems that can be caused when security fails to meet these criteria, as in the 
environment of a student residence: ‘Making sure the staircase doors are locked all 
the times is a bit of an imposition on people’s way of life actually. It’s a damn 
nuisance if your friends want to come and see you’. These tensions are generally 
recognized by those in the business of selling security:      
  
University is supposed to be welcoming. You don’t want it to be the Bastille, and I 
am firmly against the Bastille concept, as I call it. We don’t want anywhere, other 
perhaps than prisons and high security environments, to be really like that. What we 
want, if you like, is to balance the whole concept of security against operational 
effectiveness. Now A & E [Accident and Emergency] departments are a classic 
example. Because huge amounts of violence takes place against staff and others in 
accident and emergency departments in hospitals. But how can you not welcome 
people in an A & E department? 
(Security consultant)   
 
This problem was echoed by a security seller, much of whose work involved 
protecting ‘headquarters buildings for major corporations’. She recognized that ‘they 
don’t want to feel as if they are living in Fort Knox, which one can perfectly well 
understand. So you have to strike a balance’ (Manager, security company 3). 
References to the Bastille and Fort Knox in these extracts are noteworthy. It reminds 
us of the cultural link between private security and social failure. But it also suggests 
that sellers and purchasers are attuned to the communicative capacities of security – 
to the fact that it sends signals about the kind of environment one is in and projects 
an image (whether positive or negative) of the organization that owns or controls 
that environment. Having bemoaned his institution’s ‘visually horrible’ CCTV 
cameras, one university security manager we interviewed spoke of the importance 
of striking ‘a balance between not making people feel like they live in a dangerous 
place that needs to be like Colditz, and making sure that they are relatively safe’. 
 These wider organizational priorities and sensitivities matter because they 
serve as a restraint on the level and kind of security that institutional customers are 
willing to purchase. Sometimes they render certain products out of court entirely. 
We came across numerous examples of these restraints. The security manager of a 
major supermarket described his chief executive’s objection to a particular piece of 
security hardware: ‘Radford gates, the ones that allow you to go in but you need to 
be let out. The chief executive doesn’t like them very much and will have them 
ripped out. He thinks that they make it look like you are penned in the store.’ A 
security manager in the National Health Service noted her objection to having 
security guards on wards: ‘We are supposed to be a caring organization and I for one 
wouldn’t be terribly happy if I was in hospital and there were people in bullet proof 
vests, as they all wear, and uniforms walking around. So a security presence at 
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reception yes, but not walking onto wards. I do not agree with that.’ A headteacher 
we interviewed spoke in cognate terms of doing security in ways which made his 
school feel like a school: ‘We do our best to provide the kind of security we can 
afford without putting fences up everywhere and having huge gates and searching 
people as they come in.’ A security manager at major shopping centre voiced similar 
concerns in response to the question of whether post-9/11 they had considered 
introducing bag checks on customers entering the mall. In so doing, he summed up 
the constraints that an organization’s overarching purpose – in this case 
consumption – can place on the kinds of security purchases organizations are willing 
or able to make: 
 
We’re a community-based place which people want to come and enjoy, and if you 
start going down the road of creating an environment that’s almost military or 
airport-style checking, you take that away. You take the entertainment aspect away 
from people. I think people want to come here and shop because they enjoy it. It’s 
about fun, it’s about meeting people, it’s about having coffee and chatting with 
friends, and you know, finding the bargain of the day. It’s not about the military 
aspect, and the situation would have to be quite extreme for us to change that. I 
don’t think people would want to come here if it was like that.   
 
 
Feeling at home with security 
The tensions that characterize organizational spending on security are echoed when 
it comes to domestic security consumption. Our interviewees overwhelmingly 
accepted that some investment was required to secure their home and personal 
property. As a retired member of one of our focus group discussions put it: ‘I think 
it’s our responsibility to protect ourselves as far as possible; we should be doing as 
much as we can for ourselves’ (Member, focus group 1). This sense of responsibility 
translates into spending on what has become a taken-for-granted repertoire of 
security goods. This includes locks to doors and windows, and installing external 
lights and burglar alarms. It can also include putting other objects – hedges, plants 
pots, gravel – to protective uses, and purchasing goods for reasons that are in part 
security related – notably, among our respondents, dogs.  Yet these protective 
commodities are for the most part purchased begrudgingly and with little 
enthusiasm. Buying locks, gates, burglar alarms and the like is seen as a necessary, 
unglamorous activity; something that (hopefully) provides comfort and peace of 
mind, or meets the requirements of insurers, but which seldom brings any direct 
pleasure or satisfaction. As with organizations, a primary goal for individuals is to 
minimize the costs associated with security consumption: ‘I’m certainly a full 
believer in alarms, outside lights, whatever you can do without spending a ridiculous 
amount of money or going fanatical over it’ (Member, focus group 2).  
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But home security is not only a matter of money. Decisions about what falls 
within the repertoire of accepted - and socially acceptable – protective measures are 
also shaped by the challenge of ensuring that in securing one’s house one does not 
make it less of a home: people have to feel ‘at home’ with security. This requirement 
helps explain why certain domestic security products have failed to catch on, despite 
being relatively cheap, widely available and offering the promise of greater 
protection. We have argued elsewhere that domestic closed circuit television (CCTV) 
is a good case in point (Goold et al., 2013: 991-992). Our research found that the 
‘comfort’ that camera surveillance offers in public space is simply not transferable to 
the domestic realm. Quite the reverse in fact: 
 
I don’t see the need. People that come into my house are my friends or my wife’s 
friends or my children’s friends, so no . . . I think that’s . . . if people come into my 
house and they see CCTV cameras they wouldn’t, they wouldn’t feel comfortable, of 
that I’m sure, and I think they would find it rather intrusive to say the least. I think if 
you need to have CCTV cameras in your house . . . I think that is pretty worrying to be 
honest. Quite frankly, when friends of mine come to my house I want them to treat it 
as, as much as possible, as their own and not, not to think, ‘Oh that thing’s looking at 
me’. (Male interviewee 3)             
 
The anxiety about domestic CCTV is generated by the fact that is represents a form of 
‘aesthetic pollution’ (Woodward, 2006: 273) that prevents one’s home being 
understood and enjoyed as such. This extension beyond the normal repertoire of 
home protection also provokes concern because of ‘what it may say’ about the 
person who purchases it – that they are paranoid, obsessed with security, perhaps 
even voyeuristic. We found that similar concerns attach to another mode of domestic 
security that clearly tests the limits of consumer comfort: the gated housing 
development. There are societies – the USA, South Africa and Brazil for example - 
where gated communities have become commonplace in recent decades – whether 
for reasons of protection from crime or ‘lifestyle’ (Blakeley and Snyder, 1997; 
Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003). Such developments often loom large in the sociological 
literature on commodified security. Gated enclaves have however developed much 
more slowly in the UK - so much so that one can plausibly argue that, in the English 
case at least, they are a failed security good (Goold et al. 2010).5           
Part of the explanation for this ‘failure’ is to be found in a policy regime 
which requires new private housing developments to include a significant 
percentage of ‘affordable’ housing – a stipulation that reduces the appeal of gated 
                                                        
5 See Blandy (2006) for an analysis of what is known about the scale of gated communities in the UK 
and a typology of different forms of walled development. This significantly slower rate of growth has 
not prevented a dystopian disposition towards security from being brought to bear on the British case 
(see, for example, Atkinson and Blandy, 2007; Minton, 2009). 
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enclaves by, in effect, bringing within the walls those who are meant to be kept out 
by them. To this one might add the moral and social distaste found among the 
planning profession - what one of our respondents called a ‘strong culture’ which 
treats gated communities as ‘an inappropriate form of housing’ (local authority 
planner officer). As another planner we interviewed put it: ‘In this country, planners 
have a communal mind set which is against the idea of gated communities because 
they are seen as being divisive and exclusionary’ (representative, planners 
association). One result is that planning objections – together with those that are 
typically made by highways departments – restrict the number of gated 
developments that might otherwise be built. A senior figure in one major house 
builder we interviewed described the situation thus:  
 
You can’t build them without planning consent and it’s often refused by local 
authorities who think you’re providing an exclusive and undesirable community. We 
would probably do it in about 80-90 per cent of cases. As it happens we can only do 
it probably in about 40-50 per cent, mostly for planning reasons.  
      
Yet the failure of gated developments cannot solely be explained in terms of these 
restraints on supply. As one planner we interviewed put it: ‘There’s not at present a 
significant market demand for gated communities among the middle classes’. This 
sentiment was widely echoed among our interviewees (none of whom currently 
lived in gated housing, though some had relatives who did). Some of our 
respondents could see attractions in this housing form expressed in terms of greater 
privacy, extra feelings of security, or exercising control over one’s immediate 
environment. These factors could make the occupants of gated developments ‘feel a 
little bit special’, as the house builder we interviewed put it. However, these positive 
associations are not strong enough to generate much active demand for gated living. 
They also pale when set against the anxieties and antipathy that we found this 
housing form to provoke. This negative evaluation is made possible in part by the 
fact that the kind of social sorting delivered by gated enclaves is already produced by 
the operation of the housing market. It is also clear that our respondents experience 
levels of crime risk that can generally be managed by and within the existing 
repertoire of home protection. This extract from one of our focus groups with senior 
citizens encapsulates the dominant reaction to the idea of gated living:     
 
I think one of the values of where we live in Britain, where we live in a village like 
this in Britain, is the social mix. You certainly ain’t gonna get social mix in a closed 
community. And would it take off if more are built? Well more will only be built if 
there’s a need, if there’s a perceived need for them. And that need would have to be 
demonstrated by a radical breakdown in social order that one hopes won’t happen, 
and one doesn’t expect to happen in a very short term. I’ve seen these kinds of 
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things abroad. I’ve seen them in Sao Paulo. But São Paulo is a pretty hairy place. 
Who wants to live in that kind of community?  
 
Two connected aspects of this account show why gated developments are 
considered to be a step too far in pursuit of personal security. This first is that gated 
living clashes with certain received and cherished notions of community, with the 
social and aesthetic values that people associated with middle-class English 
neighbourhoods. As the above respondent put it: ‘I think as I say, the richness of the 
culture in any place in Britain is the mixture of people that live in it’ (member, focus 
group 3). From this starting point, respondents expressed ‘sadness’ (a common 
emotional refrain when we discussed this topic) about how people living in gated 
enclaves were ‘caged in’ (member, focus group 1) or ‘cut off from the rest of society’ 
(member, focus group 1). As one female interviewee opined: ‘I feel we should be one 
community, not a number of separate communities. I think it is rather sad if people 
shut themselves away in these tight compact little areas, with their own security 
very often. They probably have little day to day contact with people outside’. 
Another worried that ‘If you start segregating yourself off into little closed 
communities I think that’s a bit of a slippery slope. One of the reasons why I like this 
town is that you don’t tend to get the segregated areas that you do perhaps in larger 
towns and cities’ (female interviewee 4). In short, gated communities are unsettling 
because they rub up against a certain vision of England, and clash with some alluring 
sensibilities regarding what that society is supposed to be like. This is evident in the 
following exchange between two female interviewees: 
 
Emma: Can you imagine driving round our cities and finding, well this 
group of people behind a gate, next . . .  
Anne:  Would be horrible actually. 
Emma:  Then there’s another group of people behind a gate, all over 
the city. It’d be appalling I think. We’d no longer be a nation.   
(Focus group 3) 
 
The second theme associates gated communities with social failure. This sense of 
failure is often registered by reference to places where order has broken down to 
the extent that gated communities are needed for what one respondent called ‘pure 
security’: ‘In some places, South Africa, terribly dangerous country, I can see that it 
offers people security and a feeling of safety. But I’d hate to see that number of 
gated communities in this country’ (member, focus group 2). In the milder crime 
conditions that obtain in England, the symbolic connection of gated communities to 
social fragmentation and breakdown renders them doubly other within prevailing 
middle-class sensibilities. First, they are dismissed as ‘not for the likes of us’, a 
housing form that in the British context is socially confined to, and only acceptable 
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among, those such as ‘Mr. Abramovich’, ‘Margaret Thatcher’, ‘Wayne Rooney’, 
Robbie Williams’ and ‘Pinochet’.6 Secondly, they are marked as foreign and placed 
on a mental map that includes only places considered to be violent trouble-spots: 
‘Johannesburg’, ‘São Paulo’, ‘Los Angeles’, and ‘Florida’.7 In the English context, 
these cultural values stand as a powerful obstacle to the growth of gated housing 
developments.        
 
 
Conclusion: Towards a moral economy of security 
The cultural sociology of markets can, in principle, be brought to bear on the study 
of any market. It is, however, noteworthy that its exponents have been especially 
drawn to the analysis of what Radin (1996) calls ‘contested commodities’. This term 
denotes those goods that have been subject to a long and often continuing struggle 
over the place and limits of market exchange in their production and distribution, 
where what is perceived to be at stake is a clash between ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ 
values.  Examples include: life insurance (Zelizer, 1979; Lehtonen and Liukko, 2011); 
blood transfusion (Healy, 2006); sperm and egg donation (Almeling, 2011), and 
surrogate motherhood (Zelizer 1985). The focus of these studies has, broadly 
speaking, been on ‘the particular kinds of cultural work involved in organizing 
markets that deal in sacred products’ (Zelizer, 2011: 17). Now, of course, not all 
aspects of security are ‘sacred’ in a manner that bears comparison to the above 
examples of goods whose commodification is routinely fought over. But security is 
nonetheless a practice associated – on occasions intimately associated – with bodily 
integrity and vulnerability, with the ‘sanctity’ of home and other private spaces, and 
with the condition of the local and national environments within which people 
pursue their individual and collective projects. It is also a practice – in western 
societies at least – where market transactions occur to a greater or lesser extent in 
the shadow of a powerful and culturally resonant non-market provider – namely, the 
police. The analogies are at any rate close enough to warrant the claim that security 
is - and is likely to remain – among the goods whose commodification is troubling 
and contested.   
 The research reported in his paper has offered further evidence of this very 
point. We have shown that individuals and organizations bring a range of cultural 
resources to bear on the question of how – and whether - to purchase security 
goods and services. They typically treat the buying of security – not as the 
acquisition of a positional good, or the marker of their status, identity or group 
membership – but as a tediously necessary investment in the conditions that enable 
their individual or organizational projects to ‘go on’. Such investments in security 
                                                        
6 All names mentioned by our respondents in reference to gated communities.  
 
7 All places mentioned by our respondents in reference to gated communities. 
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typically jostle with, and are shaped and constrained by, other organizational 
priorities and objectives. People’s desire to be and feel secure is also structured by a 
range of beliefs about how they wish to live and the society they wish to live in – 
‘meta-preferences’ (Hirschman, 1982) towards the social world that, in the English 
case at least, mitigate significantly against the appeal of protecting oneself within 
gated enclosures of all kinds, from supermarkets to hospitals to homes. 
 Our research was deliberately located in a specific setting—England—and is 
to some extent about the ways in which security exchange is entangled with the 
moral conflicts and self-understandings of English society and culture. The social 
analysis of private security would undoubtedly benefit from comparative enquiries 
into the situated meanings of security commodities across different local and 
national contexts. Enquiries of this kind have not thus far informed the theoretical 
debate on the commodification of security.  That debate would also benefit from a 
differentiated analysis of the meanings of particular security goods (see, further, 
Thumala et al., 2015). These limitations notwithstanding, the present study indicates 
that, in the English context, security tends not to be understood or experienced in 
terms of goods and services which one consumes conspicuously and for aspirational 
purposes. Our research calls into question, or at least qualifies, the notion that 
security today has a logic which necessarily trumps, or colonizes, other social 
purposes and values, as well as casting doubt upon overly sweeping variants of the 
claim that ‘the quest for security organizes modern life’ (Monahan 2010: 81). It 
offers a detailed case in point of the idea that economic exchange is ‘embedded in 
larger social contexts, in criteria foreign to the market, which codetermine actions 
just as much as does economic logic’ (Stehr and Adolf, 2010: 223). We have, in sum, 
shown that the purchase of security – people’s willingness to enter and use markets 
as a means of protecting their person, property and interests – is conditioned and 
restrained by non-security commitments and non-market values. The economy of 
security is a moral economy and needs to be understood as such.     
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